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Abstract: Jaakko Hintikka proposed treating objectual perception sentences, such as
‘Alice sees Bob’, as de re propositional perception sentences. Esa Saarinen extended
Hintikka’s idea to eventive perception sentences, such as ‘Alice sees Bob smile’. These
approaches, elegant as they may be, are not philosophically neutral, for they presup-
pose, controversially, that the content of all perceptual experiences is propositional
in nature. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal treatment of objectual and
eventive perception sentences that builds on Hintikka’s modal approach to proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions while avoiding controversial assumptions on the nature of
perceptual experiences. Despite being simple and theoretically frugal, our approach is
powerful enough to express a variety of interesting philosophical views about proposi-
tional, objectual, and eventive perception sentences, thus enabling the study of their
inferential relationships.
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1 Introduction
The following are examples of perception sentences of different syntactic types:
(1) Alice sees Bob;
(2) Alice sees Bob smile;
(3) Alice sees that Bob is smiling.
Sentences of the first kind, which we call objectual perception sentences, usually in-
volve a perceptual verb like ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’, or the more general ‘perceive’,
followed by a noun phrase. Sentences of the second kind resort to the so called naked
infinitives, to attribute a perceptual experience involving events, like the event of Bob
smiling. We will call these eventive perception sentences. Finally, sentences of the
third kind involve a perception verb followed by a that-clause and are naturally under-
stood as propositional attitude ascriptions. Let us call these propositional perception
sentences.1
Hintikka (1969) suggested dealing with propositional perception sentences in anal-
ogy with his (1962) now standard treatment of knowledge ascriptions. Intuitively, just
like a sentence of the form pα knows that φq is true if and only if φ is true in every
possible world compatible with all that α knows, so a sentence of the form pα sees
that φq is true if and only if φ is true in every possible world compatible with all that
α sees (Hintikka 1969: 155).
In contrast, Hintikka did not offer any specific semantic treatment for objectual
perception sentences. Rather, he held that they can be analysed as de re propositional
perception sentences (1969: 160). For instance, in his mind, (1) can be informally
1In ordinary language, there are propositional perception sentences, like ‘I see that Trump has
been lying again’, where the content of the that-clause is not – strictly speaking – a perceptual
content. For reasons of simplicity, here we shall leave this topic aside. Some readers might think that
the content of every that-clause in the complement of perceptual verbs bears at most an indirect
relation to the perception reported, or they might even think that the content of perception is always
non-conceptual, and hence, it is never the sort of thing that is expressed in a that-clause at all. We
think that these readers might find our proposal especially interesting, for our view is consistent




(1′) ∃x Alice sees that x = Bob.
Esa Saarinen (1983: 119) proposed extending Hintikka’s paraphrase strategy to even-
tive perception sentences.2 In Saarinen’s view, a sentence like (2) is to be paraphrased
as:
(2′) ∃e (e = [Bob smiles] ∧ Alice sees that e takes place),
where the term ‘[Bob smiles]’ refers to the event of Bob smiling.
Hintikka’s and Saarinen’s paraphrase strategies, elegant as they may be, are not
philosophically neutral, for they presuppose that ascriptions of perceptual experiences
are all reducible to sentences that only involve propositional perception operators. In
turn, this presupposition is acceptable only to those who regard the content of all
perceptual experiences as reducible to some kind of propositional content. Philo-
sophically speaking, however, the view that the content of perceptual experiences is
ultimately propositional in nature is highly controversial, and it has been recently
questioned, among others, by Tim Crane (2009), Tyler Burge (2010), Christopher
Gauker (2012), and Bencey Nanay (2013). In Nanay’s words:
We have no reason to believe that all mental representations are linguis-
tically or propositionally structured . . . Some (but not all) mental states
have content. Some of these (but not all of them) have propositional
content. But perceptual states don’t. (2013: 37)
In our mind, lack of philosophical neutrality is a serious problem for Hintikka’s and
Saarinen’s paraphrase strategies. The nature of perceptual content is an extremely
delicate issue, with deep ramifications in epistemology and the philosophy of mind,
and it is not up to formal semanticists to settle it. What is reasonable to expect from
formal semanticists in this area is, rather, that they devise general linguistic and
2The extension of Hintikka’s logic of perception to sentences involving events was first proposed
by Niiniluoto 1982, and then elaborated in detail by Saarinen (1983).
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inferential frameworks within which alternative conceptions of perceptual content
can be expressed and compared and their consequences studied.
In this paper, we provide a framework of this type. More specifically, we propose
a formal treatment of objectual and eventive perception sentences that builds on Hin-
tikka’s modal approach to propositional attitude ascriptions while remaining neutral
on the relationships between perceptual and propositional content. Crucially, in con-
trast to Hintikka’s and Saarinen’s paraphrase treatments, we take objectual and even-
tive perception statements at face value, making no assumption as to whether they
can be analysed in terms of propositional perception sentences. On the other hand,
in contrast to ‘naive’ approaches (Vlach 1983), which equate objectual and eventive
perception with extensional relations between agents and objects/events (see, e.g.,
Higginbotham 1983), our proposal allows one to retain a considerable semantic uni-
formity in the analysis of propositional and eventive/objectual perception sentences,
by letting the complement of perception verbs always correspond to a class of worlds
suitably related to the world of evaluation.3 This uniformity makes it very easy to
assess the semantic consequences of a variety of principles concerning the relation be-
tween propositional, objectual, and eventive perception sentences. As a result, and as
we shall see in detail, our framework is especially well suited for thoroughly studying
the inferential import of different philosophical views on perception.
We would like to stress, once again, that the focus of the paper is the exploration
of a frugal, philosophically neutral logic of perception. We believe that a number
of remarkable points on the topic can be brought to the attention of the reader by
only resorting to minimal semantic resources. So before presenting the details of our
3This feature of our account might trigger an objection. By letting the complement of perception
verbs always correspond to sets of worlds, so the objection goes, we entail that perception is always
directed towards propositions (qua sets of worlds). Thus, our semantics is not neutral as to whether
the content of perceptual states is propositional in nature, contrary to what we claim. We think
that the objection is misguided. The fact that a semantic theory assigns a certain kind of value to
a given expression need not (and generally is not taken to) imply that the mundane denotatum of
the expression belongs to that kind. For instance, in Montague’s (1970) classic semantics, proper
names like ‘Jack’ denote sets of properties, but very few philosophers would take this semantic view
to entail that Jack is a set.
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proposal, it is important to underline that our aim is not to offer a full-fledged formal
semantics, comparable in complexity to the quite sophisticated approaches available in
the logic and linguistic literature on naked infinitives, perception reports, and related
constructions (see, e.g., Barwise 1981, Higginbotham 1983, 1999, Asher & Bonevac
1985, Neale 1988, Aloni 2001, Zucchi 2015, Abusch & Rooth 2017). Rather, our goal is
to elaborate on Hintikka’s approach to knowledge and perception – a well-established
landmark in philosophical logic – while keeping the resulting semantics as simple and
philosophically neutral as possible. The reader may also think of our proposal as a
formal toolkit for helping philosophers gain a better grasp on the inferential relations
between different views on perception.
2 Hintikka on knowledge
As mentioned above, Hintikka (1969) suggested dealing with propositional perception
sentences in analogy with his (1962) treatment of knowledge ascriptions. Before
discussing perception, let us recall his approach to knowledge.
Let L be a standard propositional language enriched with a knowledge operator K.
(Throughout the current paper, for the sake of readability, we use formal expressions
autonymously, viz., without resorting to quotation devices.) The formulae of L are
defined recursively as follows: propositional letters Q,R . . . are formulae; if φ is a
formula, then its negation ¬φ is a formula; if φ and ψ are formulae, then their
conjunction φ ∧ ψ is a formula; if φ is a formula, then Kφ is a formula; nothing
else is a formula. Other Boolean connectives are defined as usual. Kφ is the formal
counterpart of a knowledge ascription of the form pA certain agent α knows that φq
(or pIt is known that φq if the identity of α is deemed irrelevant).
Formulae are evaluated on Kripke models M = (W,R, σ), where W is a non-empty
set of possible worlds, R is a binary reflexive relation on W , and σ is a function that
maps each letter to a subset of W . If w and v are worlds in W , then w R v entails,
intuitively, that v is compatible with what the agent α knows in w.
We let JφKM indicate the intension of a formula φ in model M. Intuitively, JφKM
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is the set of worlds where φ is true in M. The notion of truth of a formula φ in a
world w in a model M, in symbols w ∈ JφKM, is defined as follows:
(i) For propositional letters Q, w ∈ JQKM if and only if w ∈ σ(Q);
(ii) w ∈ J¬φKM if and only if it is not the case that w ∈ JφKM;
(iii) w ∈ Jφ ∧ ψKM if and only if w ∈ JφKM and w ∈ JψKM;
(iv) w ∈ JKφKM if and only if v ∈ JφKM for all v ∈W such that w R v.
Intuitively, clause (iv) says that α knows that φ in w if and only if φ is true in all
the worlds compatible with what α knows in w. It is usual to assume that only true
propositions can be objects of knowledge, that is to say, that knowledge is factive.
This is the reason why reflexivity is imposed on the accessibility relation R, thus
ensuring that the world w is always included within the worlds compatible with what
α knows in w. As a result, the following principle, which expresses the factivity of
knowledge, is valid:
(A) Kφ→ φ.
3 Hintikka on propositional perception
We have just seen that in Hintikka’s treatment of knowledge ascriptions, a cognitive
agent α in w is associated with a set of possible worlds representing all the differ-
ent ways reality could be, compatibly with α’s propositional knowledge in w. These
worlds are called epistemic alternatives to w. Hintikka suggested dealing with propo-
sitional perception in a strictly analogous way by associating a perceiving agent α in
w with a set of possible worlds representing all the different ways reality could be,
compatibly with α’s propositional perceptions in w (Hintikka 1969: 155). Let us call
these worlds propositional perceptual alternatives to w.
The language L′ is identical with L, except that the place of K is taken by a
perception operator P. Intuitively, P is the formal counterpart of ‘perceive’ (or,
interchangeably, of more specific verbs like ‘see’, ‘hear’ . . . ; see Hintikka 1969: 156).
Accordingly, Pφ corresponds to sentences of form pα perceives (see, hear . . . ) that φq
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or, if you prefer, pIt is perceived (seen, heard . . . ) that φq.
We let a Kripke model M′ be a triple (W,RP , σ), where W and σ are as above,
and RP is a binary relation on W that, intuitively, connects each world with its
propositional perceptual alternatives. Truth in a world in a model M′ is defined as
follows:
(i′)–(iii′) similar to clauses (i)–(iii) above;
(iv′) w ∈ JPφKM′ if and only if v ∈ JφKM′ for all v such that w RP v.
It is common to assume that propositional perception is factive (see, e.g., Williamson
2000: 34). In the remainder of the current paper, we shall stick to this assumption
and require that RP be reflexive, so ensuring that no one can perceive (see, hear . . . )
that φ in w if it is not the case that φ in w. As a result, the following principle, which
expresses the factivity of propositional perception, turns out to be valid:
(B) Pφ→ φ.
4 Semantics for objectual and eventive perception sen-
tences
As mentioned above, Hintikka proposed extending his treatment of propositional
perception sentences to objectual perception sentences by paraphrasing the latter in
terms of the former. We will go in a different direction. Like Hintikka, in evaluating
all kinds of perception sentences, we will resort to a set of possible worlds representing
the alternative ways the world could be, compatibly with what a given agent perceives.
However, unlike Hintikka, we will not reduce all perception sentences to (constructions
over) propositional perception sentences.
We have seen (in great detail) how Hintikka suggested dealing with propositional
perception in analogy with his treatment of knowledge. In Hintikka’s mind, what
changes when passing from one propositional attitude to the other is the relation of
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compatibility at play. Sentences of form pα knows that φq are dealt with in terms
of a relation of compatibility between worlds and the things that α knows; sentences
of form pα perceives that φq, in terms of a relation of compatibility between worlds
and the things that α propositionally perceives. We think that the analogy goes
further than Hintikka envisaged. It is not just propositional perception that can
be profitably dealt with by appealing to a suitable relation of compatibility. Also
non-propositional perception can be. More specifically, objectual perception can be
dealt with by appealing to a notion of compatibility between worlds and the things
that the relevant agent objectually perceives. To make this idea work, we must distil
a reasonable notion of compatibility between worlds and non-propositional objects
of perception, which mimics Hintikka’s notion of compatibility between worlds and
propositions.4
Now, when propositional objects of perception are at stake,5 compatibility relative
to a world w (in Hintikka’s sense) requires truth: w is compatible with the perception
that φ if and only if, in w, it is true that φ. Our guiding thought is that when
dealing with non-propositional targets, truth is to be replaced with actuality. More
specifically, we take w to be compatible with a perceived object o if and only if, in w,
o is actual. To say that an object o is actual in a world w, in our sense, is tantamount
to saying that o is located in w or, if you prefer, that o exists in w.6
Here, we are treating actuality as a perspectival, world-relative feature. However,
we do not attach any special philosophical significance to this choice. If you think
that there exists an absolute, non-relative notion of actuality (see, e.g., Bricker 2006),
you can treat actuality, in the sense relevant here, as a different, possibly derivative
notion. Alternatively, in what follows, you can replace ‘is actual’ with ‘is located’,
4See (Iaquinto & Spolaore 2019) for a semantic analysis of ascriptions of knowledge of acquaintance
based on a similar strategy.
5Please do not understand this casual talk of ‘propositional objects’ as entailing a full-fledged
ontological commitment towards semantic entities.
6Here we are presupposing that, in some sense, objects can be identified across worlds. However,
we take no definite stance as to how identity across worlds is cashed out from a philosophical view-
point, and we rest content with the assumption that at least some objects/events are actual in more
than one world.
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or with ‘exists’, or what have you. All that we require is that actuality (locatedness,
existence . . . ) be regarded as a possibly contingent feature, that is, as a feature that
some object possesses in some worlds but not in all of them. Let us stress that for
our purposes, actuality need not be taken as a property that only ‘external’, public
entities can possess. Accordingly, our proposal can be made consistent with the view
that perception is (primarily) directed towards private, phenomenal entities.7
We have said that the notion of compatibility at play in objectual perception
involves actuality. The same goes with eventive perception. We surmise that a world
w is compatible with a perceived event e if and only if, in w, e is actual. To say that
an event e is actual in w is to say that e is located in w or (in Saarinen’s terminology)
that it takes place in w. Again, we assume that actuality is a possibly contingent
feature of events.
4.1 Basic semantics
It is straightforward to turn the ideas outlined thus far into a formal semantics for
perception sentences. In what follows, to make the analogy between our approach
and Hintikka’s treatment of propositional perception sentences clearer, we stick with
a language Lp that is as similar as possible to the above propositional language L′.
Language Lp includes a countable set Ω of objectual letters o, o′ . . . and a countable
set ∆ of eventive letters e, f . . . Intuitively, the letters in Ω correspond to objects (like
Bob) and the letters in ∆ to events (like Bob smiling). In our informal moments, we
shall also use these letters to indicate the corresponding object or event. For each
objectual letter o, Lp includes one or more object-involving eventive letters eo, e′o . . . .
Object-involving (eventive) letters are the formal counterparts of naked infinitive
clauses like ‘Bob smile’ – intuitively, they correspond to events having the indicated
object as participant.8 We collectively indicate objectual and eventive letters of Lp
7This is a common view among both sense data theorists (e.g., Robinson 1994, Jackson 1977,
Casullo 1987, Garcia-Carpintero 2001, O’Shaughnessy 2003) and internalist representationalists (e.g.,
Rey 1993, 1997, 1998).
8Nothing forbids further extending Lp by adding object-involving eventive letters that correspond
to relational naked infinitives such as ‘Alice kiss Bob’. However, they have limited interest for our
purposes, and we shall ignore them. In the next section, we shall define an extended language in
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as terms. If x is a term, Lp includes propositional atoms of forms Ax and Px. Ax is
called an actuality sentence. Informally, Ao says that the object o is actual (exists),
while Ae says that the event e is actual (takes place). Intuitively, an atom of form
Px says that α perceives x.
The formulae of Lp can be defined recursively as follows: if x is a term of Lp, then
Px and Ax are atoms of Lp; atoms are formulae; if φ and ψ are formulae of Lp, then
¬φ, φ ∧ ψ and Pφ are formulae of Lp. Nothing else is a formula.
Three remarks about Lp are in order. First, objectual or eventive letters can
never occur as formulae unless they are prefixed with the operators A or P. Thus,
expressions like o and e are not formulae of Lp. Second, Lp does not enrich L′ with any
new perception operator. In Lp, like in English, the distinction between propositional,
objectual, and eventive perception sentences is encoded by a difference in form and
not by a difference in the lexicon of perception. Thus, just as Pφ corresponds to
propositional perception sentences, so Po and Pe correspond, respectively, to objectual
and eventive perception sentences. Third, if we think of an eventive letter e as the
formal counterparts of a naked infinitive clause, we can think of the actuality sentence
Ae as the formal counterpart of the corresponding indicative sentence. Thus, for
instance, if eo reads ‘Bob smile’, then Aeo reads ‘Bob smiles’. Atoms of form Ax are
the closest analogue in Lp of the propositional letters of L and L′.
We let a Kripke model Mp be a tuple (W,RP , RO, RE , ε), where W and RP are
as above. Intuitively, binary relation RO (RE) holds between worlds w, v if and only
if v is compatible with the objectual (eventive) perceptions of the relevant agent α in
w. The interpretation function ε is a mapping from objectual and eventive letters to
subsets of W . Intuitively, if x is a term, then ε(x) is the set of the worlds where the
object or the event denoted by x is actual. We let the intension of a term x relative
to Mp, in symbol JxKMp, be a set of worlds in W – intuitively, the worlds where the
denotation of x is actual in Mp. We impose that ε(x) = JxKMp for all terms x of Lp.
The notion of truth in a world in a model Mp is defined as follows:
(i′′) a. w ∈ JAxKMp if and only if w ∈ JxKMp;
b. w ∈ JPxKMp, with x objectual term, if and only if v ∈ JxKMp for all worlds
which certain specific examples of relational naked infinitives are expressible.
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v ∈W such that w RO v;
c. w ∈ JPxKMp, with x eventive term, v ∈ JxKMp for all worlds v ∈ W such
that w RE v;
(ii′′)–(iv′′) similar to clauses (ii′)–(iv′) above.
Logical properties are defined in the usual way.
We assume, plausibly enough, that all participants to actual events are themselves
actual. So, for any object-involving letter eo, we require that ε(eo) ⊆ ε(o). The
following schema is therefore valid:
(C) Aeo → Ao (e.g., ‘If Bob smiles, then Bob is actual’.)
We also take for granted that all the things (objects or events) we perceive are actual,
that is, that we do not perceive merely possible things (see also, e.g., Crane & French
2017: esp. § 1.1.2). Accordingly, we require that RO and RE be reflexive, thus
ensuring that the following principles are valid:
(D) Po→ Ao,
(E) Pe→ Ae.
Principles (D) and (E) can be seen as the objectual and eventive analogues of the
above factivity principle (B). By (D) and (E), perceiving an object o (or an event e)
requires that o (e) be actual, just like, by (B), perceiving that φ requires φ to be true.
If we drop the reflexivity of the accessibility relations, we are in a position to
account also for non-factive uses of perception sentences, some of which are well at-
tested in natural languages. For instance, a sentence like ‘Bob sees the stick bend’
can be used to report Bob’s impression that the stick bends while being immersed
in water, even if the stick is not actually bending.9 Moreover, as Hintikka (1975: 68)
himself highlights, avoiding the assumption that the accessibility relation is reflexive
allows to ‘discuss such epistemologically interesting problems as illusions, hallucina-
tions, perceptual mistakes, impossible objects, etc.’. Dropping the factivity constrain
9See Bourget 2017 for a recent defence of the view that non-factive uses of perception sentences
are to be taken seriously from a semantic viewpoint.
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on the objectual perception operator, for instance, allows to model what we could
describe as its weak counterpart, to be employed in the formal treatment of seeing
as statements (Howell 1972) and visual illusions and hallucinations (Niiniluoto 1982).
Other interesting applications can be offered in dealing with objectual and eventive
imagination sentences (Niiniluoto 1985) and with (non-veridical) perceptions in pic-
torial narratives (Abusch & Rooth 2017). Although we recognise the philosophical
importance of such applications, in this paper we will focus only on factive uses of the
perception operators, leaving the extension of our logic to other classes of sentences
for future work.
4.2 A refinement: events of perception
It is reasonable to suppose that there are events of perception, such as the event of
Alice seeing Bob. And it appears that events of perception can be perceived too. In
order to account for this possibility, we need to (mildly) extend our language Lp.
Let L+p be a language that is identical to Lp except that it contains an additional,
‘naked infinitive’ functor ni. Intuitively, ni turns certain sentences φ of L+p into the
corresponding naked infinitive phrases niφ. We take phrases of form pniφq to be
(complex) terms for events. As such, they can be the object of eventive perception
sentences of form Pniφ.
Not all English sentences can be turned into naked infinitive phrases. For instance,
conditionals (e.g., ‘If Alice smiles, Bob blinks’) have no naked infinitive counterpart.
Moreover, whether and how negative naked infinitives (e.g., ‘Bob not smile’) can be
made to correspond to (negative) events is a highly controversial issue, and one that
is broadly independent of the logic and philosophy of perception (see, e.g., Casati
& Varzi 2020: § 2.5, Bernard & Champollion 2018). Finally, it is unclear whether
perception sentences involving conjunctive/disjunctive naked infinitives (e.g., ‘Alice
sees Bob smile and/or Ed blink’) are anything but syntactical transformations of
conjunctions/disjunctions of perception sentences (‘Alice sees Bob smile and/or she
sees Ed blink’) (see, e.g., Vlach 1983: 137–138).
For these reasons, in what follows, we make the simplifying stipulation that the
functor ni does not apply to formulae whose main operator is a Boolean connective –
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which means, ni only applies to formulae whose main operators are A or P. Accord-
ingly, the set of terms of L+p can be defined as follows: if x is an objectual or eventive
letter of L+p , then x is a term of L+p ; if Pφ is a (propositional, objectual, eventive)
perception sentence of L+p , then niPφ is a term of L+p ; if Aφ is an actuality sentence,
then niAφ is a term of L+p ; nothing else is a term of L+p .
In order to have a workable definition of truth in models Mp for sentences of L+p ,
there is no need to introduce any modification in the above clauses (i′′)–(iv′′). All we
need to do is to extend the notion of intension of terms to complex eventive terms
of form niφ. To this aim, we let the intension JniφKMp of a complex eventive term
niφ coincide with the intension JφKMp of the embedded sentence φ, that is, with the
class of worlds where φ is true. As a result, our semantics validates the biconditional
Aniφ↔ φ.10 This is only natural: reasonably, the event of Alice perceiving Bob smile
is actual (takes place) exactly in those worlds where Alice perceives Bob smile, and
the event of Bob smiling is actual precisely in those worlds where Bob smiles.
Let us observe that the resulting semantics is philosophically neutral in that it does
not validate any specific principle concerning (the perception of) events of perception,
except for those principles that trivially follows from the factivity of perception, like:
(F) Pniφ→ φ.
We introduced the operator ni to describe cases in which events of perception are
themselves perceived. But our language L+p only allows us to speak about iterated
perceptual events performed by a single agent (e.g., Alice perceiving Alice perceive
something). Cases in which an agent perceives another agent perceiving something
are not expressible in L+p . It is possible to overcome this limitation by adopting a
10 By the (idealising) assumption that propositional perception is closed under entailment, this
principle implies the equivalence PAniφ ↔ Pφ (e.g., Alice perceives that the event of Bob smiling
is actual if and only if she perceives that Bob smiles). This equivalence might sound problematic,
for it seems to put strong constraints on the relation between propositional and eventive perception.
Arguably, however, this impression is based on a confusion between PAniφ↔ Pφ and the seemingly
similar (but invalid) schema Pniφ ↔ Pφ (e.g., Alice perceives Bob smile if and only if she perceives
that Bob smile). The validity of Pniφ ↔ Pφ would indeed lead to a collapse of propositional and
eventive perception sentences. Nothing similar can be said about PAniφ ↔ Pφ, which does not
concern eventive perception and is not especially problematic in our idealised framework (see also
the discussion about principle (G) below, p. 15).
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more powerful language, which allows us to make implicit or explicit reference to a
plurality of agents.11 However, the aim of dealing with perception in a multi-agent
framework vastly exceeds the limited purposes of this paper. For this reason in what
follows, we shall content ourselves with the limited expressive resources provided by
our simple language L+p .
5 Philosophical applications
As stressed above, we are not assuming that perception sentences can always be
analysed in terms of propositional perception sentences. This does not prevent us,
however, from exploring how propositional, objectual, and eventive perception sen-
tences relate to one another. Indeed, our framework is especially well suited for
formally studying these relations.
5.1 How propositional perception relates to objectual and eventive
perception
Let us start by considering the relations between propositional and (factive) objectual
perception sentences. To begin with, it is prima facie plausible to suppose that
(factive) objectual perception has always some import on propositional perception.
For instance, it is natural to think that Bob cannot see Alice without seeing that she
is a physical thing, that she is close to him, or at least that she is actual. If this is
correct, then it is natural to subscribe to the following principle:
(G) Po→ PAo (viz., if an agent α perceives an object o, then α perceives that o is
actual).
11A natural choice would be a language L++p including, in place of a unique perception operator P,
a set of perception operators {P′,P′′ . . . }, each corresponding (informally) to an agent. A semantics
for L++p can be defined by modifying the above semantics for L+p along two lines. First, models for
L++p must include, in place of the three accessibility relations RP , RO and RE , three corresponding
sets of agent-indexed accessibility relations {R′P , R′′P . . . }, {R′O, R′′O . . . }, {R′E , R′′E . . . }. Second, the
above semantic clauses (iv′), (i′′)-b and (i′′)-c must be modified by replacing any reference to the
perceptual operator P and to the accessibility relations RP , RO and RE with a reference to their
suitable agent-indexed counterparts.
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Albeit natural, principle (G) is not philosophically uncontroversial. Consider, for in-
stance, Dretske’s (1969, 1981) distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic per-
ception. According to Dretske, objectual perception can be non-epistemic in the sense
that it need not come with any accompanying propositional attitude about the per-
ceived object – someone, say, an infant, may perceive an object without perceiving
that the object has any specific property. There is no general agreement as to whether
objectual perception is non-epistemic in this sense (see Demircioglu 2017 for a recent
discussion of the topic).
Our general framework is consistent both with the adoption of (G) and with its
rejection, so offering a neutral tool with which one can contrast different views on
perception. Let us note, moreover, that one may hold (with Dretske) that propo-
sitional perception and objectual perception are conceptually independent from one
another, while insisting that (G) is a plausible principle when what is at stake is the
actual behaviour of competent perceiving agents, who are very unlikely to perceive
something without realising that the thing is actual. Alternatively, one can draw a
distinction between explicit and implicit perception, in analogy with the distinction
between implicit and explicit belief (and knowledge) discussed in the formal episte-
mology literature. For instance, by adapting to our system the core idea of awareness
logic (Fagin & Halpern 1988), one can say that an agent α explicitly perceives that
φ if and only if α perceives that φ while being aware of φ. The underlying thought is
that, for example, Alice might perceive (implicitly) that Bob is actual without being
aware of what she is perceiving and, so, without perceiving explicitly that Bob is
actual. Explicit perception is thus stronger than implicit perception, and it need not
be closed under entailment. If this distinction is adopted, then one can accept (G)
as a valid principle when dealing with implicit perception, while rejecting it when it
comes to explicit perception.
Within our framework, at any rate, it is easy to show that (G) corresponds to the
following property (the proof is straightforward):
(G′) For any worlds w, v, if w RP v, then w RO v (viz., RP⊆RO).
Intuitively, (G′) says that all the propositional perceptual alternatives to a world
are also (say) objectual perceptual alternatives to that world. If we think of the
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magnitude of the information provided by a certain source as inversely proportional
to the amount of worlds that are compatible with that information, we can conclude
that objectual perception provides at most as much information as propositional
perception. Let us observe that the equivalence between this view and principle (G)
is far from obvious, and it is remarkable that the framework outlined thus far allows
one to formally prove it.
It is well known that Hintikka’s (1962) framework allows one to model various
principles of epistemic introspection. One can formalise, for instance, the idea that
if α knows that φ then α knows that α knows that φ. Analogous principles, of
course, can be introduced within Hintikka’s logic of perception attributions. Here, we
are interested in an introspection principle connecting propositional perception with
objectual perception. Consider the following schema:
(H) Po→ PPo (viz., if α perceives o, then α perceives that α perceives o).
Our framework allows us to highlight an interesting inferential relation between this
introspection principle and the above principe G (viz., Po→ PAo): as far as objectual
perception is taken to be factive, (H) is strictly stronger than G. In other words, if
RO is reflexive, the introspection principle (H) entails G but not vice versa.
12 Let
us also stress that within our framework, no introspection principle involving only
propositional perception (such as, for instance, Pφ → PPφ) immediately entails any
introspection principle that, like (H), concerns non-propositional perception. This is
as it should be, at least if one thinks that the issue whether propositional and non-
propositional perceptions are independent of one another should not be adjudicated
by logic or semantics alone (see also above, p. 3). Further principles of epistemic
introspection that can be analysed within our framework include, among others, Pφ→
12To prove this, it is sufficient to observe that, by standard correspondence theory, (H) corresponds
to the following frame property:
(H′) If w RP v and v RO v
′, then w RO v
′,
which, by the reflexivity of RO, clearly entails (G
′) (viz., if w RP v, then w RO v). The converse
entailment does not hold, however, for (G′) does not exclude that, for some w, v, v′, (H′) is false –
that is, that w RP v, v RO v
′, but w 6RO v′.
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PniPφ (if α perceives that φ, then α perceives α perceive that φ), Po → PniPo (if
α perceives o, then α perceives α perceive o), Pe → PniPe (if α perceives e, then α
perceives α perceive e). For reasons of time, we leave the discussion of these further
principles to another occasion.
As we underlined above, a crucial feature of our framework is that it allows us
to express and compare different views on perception. It is thus interesting to note
that to formalise Hintikka’s view that objectual perception sentences are ultimately
reducible to propositional perception sentences, it suffices to take both G and its
converse as axioms:
(I) PAo→ Po
(I) expresses the principle that no agent can perceive that an object o is actual
without perceiving o. Intuitively, taking the conjunction of G and (I) as valid leads
to a collapse of the distinction between the alternatives associated with the agent
in evaluating propositional perception sentences and those associated in evaluating
objectual perception sentences. That is to say, the sets of alternatives against which
we evaluate propositional perception sentences and objectual perception sentences
are one and the same, just like in Hintikka’s proposal.
Virtually all that we have said so far on the relation between objectual and propo-
sitional perception also holds for the relation between eventive and propositional per-
ception. Again, it is natural to maintain that if an agent α perceives an event e,
then α also perceives that e is actual – that is to say, that e is happening. Thus, by
parity of reasoning, we can conclude that the following eventive counterpart of (G)
is plausible:
(J) Pe→ PAe (viz., if α perceives e, then α perceives that e is actual).
The above remarks (p. 15) about principle (G) can be extended to (J). So, one might
hold that (J), just like (G), is a reasonable principle when suitably restricted to certain
classes of agents or to certain kinds of perception.
Within our framework, one can express the view that eventive perception sen-
tences are reducible to propositional perception sentences by adding the converse of
(J) as an axiom:
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(K) PAe→ Pe
As seen here in the case of G and (I), if one adopts both (J) and (K), then
one is committed to evaluating eventive perception sentences relative to the same
background of perceptual alternatives as propositional perception sentences.13
5.2 Objectual and eventive perception
Consider the following inference:
(4) Alice sees Bob smile. Therefore, Alice sees Bob.
It is tempting to regard (4) as valid. For how is it possible to see a person smile without
at the same time seeing that person? More generally, it appears that a sentence of
form pα sees o take part in the event eq cannot be true without the corresponding
sentence of form pα sees oq being true as well. (Among others things, this view
is consistent with the thesis that events are somehow metaphysically dependent on
objects; see, e.g., Lombard 1986.) If that is correct, then the following principle is
valid:
(L) Peo → Po
For any object o, in L+p there is a co-intensional term niAo that denotes the event (or
the eventuality) of o existing – viz., an event that, by necessity, is actual if and only
if o is. In our framework, it is natural to take niAo to denote an event involving o.
Reasonably enough, then, principle (L) entails:
(M) PniAo→ Po
Let us observe that principle (L) (along with (M)) is not generally valid within
our framework (not even if we accept, in accordance with principle (C), that the
13However, the converse conditional does not hold. For instance, although Saarinen (1983) evalu-
ates propositional and eventive perception sentences relative to the same background of alternatives,
he would not accept the conjunction of (J) and (K), for he does not regard de dicto propositional
perception sentences as equivalent to their de re counterparts. To adequately account for the re-
lation between de dicto and de re perception sentences, a more expressive framework than the one
introduced thus far would be needed (see also below, p. 20).
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actuality of eo entails the actuality of o).
14 Thus, if we want (L) to be valid, we
have to impose some further constraint on our frames, namely, that they satisfy the
following property:
(L′) For any worlds w, v, if w RO v, then w RE v (viz., RO⊆RE)15
If, as above, we take the informativeness of a source as inversely proportional to
the amount of worlds that are compatible with the information it provides, then (L′)
says that eventive perception provides, at most, as much information as objectual
perception. This conclusion may sound surprising (if anything, it is eventive per-
ception that looks informationally richer than objectual perception), and it is also
surprising to note that it corresponds to a seemingly innocent principle like (L).
Also the converse of principle (M) may appear to be plausible, as it is tempting
to suppose that, every time an agent α perceives an object o, α also perceives α exist:
(N) Po→ PniAo
Interestingly enough, principle (N) is consistent with the claim that objects meta-
physically depend on the events in which they take part (see Parsons 1991).
Notoriously, there are philosophers who think that metaphysically speaking, there
is no significant distinction between objects and events. They tend to conceive of
ordinary objects (chairs, persons, cats, etc.) as temporally extended entities, as four-
dimensional ‘worms’ that, in all respects, behave as events (see, among others, Quine
1950, Lewis 1986, Heller 1990, Sider 2001). Within such a framework, any object
corresponds to an event (say, the object qua event), and it seems correct to say that
an agent α perceives an object o if and only if α perceives o qua event. If we let niAo
represent such event, then the following principle turns out to be valid:
(O) Po↔ PniAo
14To see this, it is enough to consider a sample counter-model Mp = (W,RP , RO, RE , ε) such that
W = (w,w′, w′′), RP is a suitable reflexive relation, RO is the reflexive closure of {(w,w′), (w,w′′)},
RE is the reflexive closure of {(w,w′)}, and JeoKMp = JoKMp = {w,w′}.
15The proof is simple but not immediate, for the operators in the antecedent and in the consequent
of (L) apply to different letters. As for the (L) to (L′) direction, suppose that the frame property
(L′) does not hold. If so, we can use the counter-model just provided in note 14 to show that (L) is
not valid. The (L′) to (L) direction is obvious, if one recalls that, by principle (C), JeoKMp ⊆ JoKMp.
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Principle (O) follows from the conjunction of (L) and (N). (O) is valid under the
assumption that RE = RO, that is to say, that the objectual and the eventive acces-
sibility relations collapse into one another.
Other interesting principles can be analysed by extending our framework. For
instance, by developing a first order version with identity, one can express principles
like:
(P) Po → ∃xPx = o
(Q) Pe → ∃xPx = e
Principle (P) says that if α perceives an object o, then there is an object x such that
α perceives that x and o are the same object. Analogously, principle (Q) says that if
α perceives an event e, then there is an event x such that α perceives that x and e
are identical. A thorough examination of these and other related principles would be
well beyond the scope of the present work.16 We leave it for another paper.
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